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
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Weekly Summary

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December 17, 1976

The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.

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Soviet Union

US RELATIONS 1-4

Georgy Arbatov, a leading expert on the US, has cautioned a Soviet audience that a new administration in the US does not necessarily mean instant progress for Soviet-US relations. Arbatov has also been tasked with signaling to US officials a positive Soviet attitude toward arms control negotiations.

An article in *Pravda* last week by Arbatov, director of the USA Institute, put President-elect Carter and Secretary of State - designate Vance in a favorable light. It implied, however, that "deep-seated factors and trends in US policy" will create difficulties in improving relations.

The article is Arbatov's first in the national press since last spring, when "detente" was under attack in the US during the primaries. It is consistent with the view previously expressed by the Soviets that such key issues as strategic arms limitations, mutual and balanced force reductions, the Middle East, and economic relations are stalemated, but that the door is open to any US demarche. In the past few weeks, this position has been given more weight by public and private remarks of General Secretary Brezhnev.

Recent Soviet commentary has also emphasized the importance to the new Soviet five year plan of economic dealings with the West. The USSR has cautioned that ties will develop faster with those states willing to "ensure equal conditions" in trade. Brezhnev has said, for example, that it is "unacceptable" for the US to link trade with emigration and that granting most-favored-nation status and expanded credits to the USSR is a prerequisite to increased trade.

Arbatov's article in *Pravda* highlighted the need for movement in disarmament—a theme officials of his institute

privately stressed several weeks earlier in remarks on the importance of a new strategic arms limitations agreement and the need for voluntary restraint.

Arbatov, who is usually out in front of Moscow's public position on disarmament matters, indicated that the USSR may be willing to agree to a five-year moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions. Soviet officials have hitherto insisted on excluding such explosions from any comprehensive nuclear test ban. The Soviets are aware that President-elect Carter has linked weapons tests and peaceful explosions in any prohibition or freeze.



Georgy Arbatov

Soviet officials are also continuing to show their concern over nuclear proliferation and may be signaling a willingness to consider regional nuclear fuel storage and reprocessing centers. Moscow favors limiting the assistance given to potential nuclear weapons states and would probably go along with any effort to prevent the spread of national nuclear reprocessing.

The Soviets may hope their conciliatory remarks will prompt the US to move ahead on SALT and to consider restrain-

ing its own weapons programs. Arbatov stressed the importance of signals of this type and suggested as an example that any decision to slow down the B-1 bomber program should be communicated privately to Soviet leaders.

QADHAFI VISIT 6-8

The communique issued after President Qadhafi's visit to the USSR last week reflected a substantial strengthening in Soviet-Libyan relations over the past two years. Qadhafi, who was making his first trip to Moscow, was warmly received by Soviet leaders.

The four days of talks produced a shipping agreement, as well as agreements on cultural, economic, and technical cooperation. Following Qadhafi's return to Tripoli, Libyan media reported that an additional agreement was signed providing for Soviet construction of a nuclear power station.

The communique's references to friendship and cooperation imply that the two sides may be working toward a protocol that would mark a new phase in Soviet-Libyan relations. Moscow uses such protocols to "normalize" bilateral relations. The Libyan press stressed that Qadhafi's visit was intended to establish a "model for relations" between small states and major powers.

At this juncture, however, neither country is likely to be interested in a formal friendship treaty. Qadhafi remains deeply suspicious of the Soviets, and Brezhnev has no illusions about the Libyan leader's erratic nature.

Differences that continue to separate the two countries are evident in the wording of the communique:

- There was no mention of the Geneva conference on the Middle East, which Qadhafi denigrated in his public remarks in Moscow.

- Fewer hostile references to Israel in the Soviet version of the communique reflect Soviet efforts to return

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President Qadhafi (third from left) visiting a Soviet military academy last week

the protagonists in the Middle East to the Geneva forum.

- The failure to refer to the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole representative of the Palestinian people as well as the handling of the issue of Palestinian statehood were certainly dictated by Libyan ties

with the more radical fedayeen groups.

The Libyan armed forces commander played a prominent part in the talks, suggesting that additional Soviet military support can be expected. The communique, however, carried no specific reference to Soviet-Libyan military ties.

Libya has been able to absorb only a

fraction of the substantial amounts of military equipment it has acquired from the USSR during the past two years. Most of the material is in storage, and Qadhafi's plans to expand his forces are limited by Libya's small pool of manpower with technical skills.

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Europe

SPAIN

12-13

Spanish voters gave overwhelming approval to Prime Minister Suarez' political reform program in a referendum held on December 15. The wide margin of victory and a voter turnout of 80 percent have buttressed the government's claim that it has widespread popular support.

The referendum results, which formally ratify constitutional reforms approved by the Spanish parliament last month, set the stage for the election next spring of a bicameral legislature. It will be Spain's first popularly elected parliament in 40 years.

With the exception of the far left and the far right, most of the roughly 200 po-

litical organizations in Spain wanted the reforms to be ratified. Many of the leftist opposition parties advocated abstention, however, essentially on the grounds that the reforms are being imposed by a nonelected government that excludes some political parties—notably the Communists—from the political process.

These objections, voiced most forcefully by the Communists and Socialists, made it politically impossible for leftist opposition groups to favor the referendum openly. Some of the more moderate opposition parties endorsed the reforms implicitly by refusing to call for abstention.

The government made unsparing efforts to ensure a heavy vote, even at the risk of inviting comparisons with the carefully arranged referendums of the Franco era. The Communist Party remained under ban, and restrictions were imposed on the campaign activities of the democratic opposition—which has declined to apply for legalization, partly

out of solidarity with the Communists.

Official spokesmen stressed that any response, including abstention, could be advocated freely, but policemen harassed leftists distributing pro-abstention literature.

Because the results of the referendum were regarded as a foregone conclusion—only the margin of victory was in doubt—most political parties had already been looking ahead to preparations for the legislative election.

The outcome of the referendum does not provide any reliable indication of the strengths of the various political groups. The promoters of the "yes" vote were too diverse, and many leftists obviously broke party ranks and endorsed the reforms. In addition, the abstentions include not only the disciplined followers of the Socialist, Communist, and regional parties, but potential voters who did not participate out of apathy or for other reasons.

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PORTUGAL 15-16

Each of Portugal's four major parties can find some cause for satisfaction in the outcome of the local elections held on December 12, but none will find it easy to translate the results into concrete political gains.

The Socialist Party proved again that it still has substantially greater support than any of the other parties, even though its share of the votes cast in municipal chamber elections—33 percent—was nearly 2 points below what the party received in the legislative election last spring. The Socialists alone commanded relatively balanced support throughout the country, winning mayoral races both in the conservative north and in Communist strongholds in the south.

The vote cannot be regarded, ho25X6 as a reaffirmation of the viability of the Socialist minority government. Dissatisfaction with the limited accomplishments of the Socialists has grown during the government's five-month tenure, and Prime Minister Soares must still demonstrate that his government is capable of dealing with Portugal's serious economic problems.

Public attitudes toward the Socialists were not necessarily reflected accurately in the local tallies. The 35-percent abstention rate—nearly twice that in the legislative election—may mean that people are losing faith in the government and in the political process. A ban on media campaigning also reduced voter turnout.

Soares will now probably have even greater difficulty with the other major parties:

- The centrist Social Democrats retained the support of 24 percent of the electorate, but managed to elect as many mayors as did the Socialists.
- The Communists scored substantial gains, winning 18 percent of the vote. This was probably due to improved grassroots organization, the



Prime Minister Soares

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poor showing by the far left, and the high abstention rate, which affected potential supporters of the other parties more than the disciplined Communist voters.

- The conservative Social Democratic Center registered slight gains, but not enough to prevent the Communists from placing third in the overall tally.

Opposition parties will undoubtedly continue to press for a broadening of the government. The Social Democrats, who are hesitant to become involved in a formal coalition with the Socialists, want the Soares government to be replaced by one made up of technocrats. The Communists are insisting on a government role of their own. The Socialists have no intention of considering either of these solutions, and President Eanes appears to be reluctant to risk instability by replacing the government too soon.


EC

17-18

EC foreign ministers, meeting this week in Brussels, approved tough measures sharply reducing the catch third-country fishermen will be allowed to take in EC waters next year.

The Community will establish a 200-nautical-mile fishing zone in the North Atlantic and North Sea on January 1. Some states that have not negotiated a reciprocal fishing agreement with the Community—the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Finland—will be allowed to continue fishing EC waters, but only for three months and at substantially reduced levels. Bulgaria and Romania, which only recently began to fish in EC waters, will be excluded totally as of January 1.

If any of these states want to continue fishing within the EC's 200-nautical-mile zone after March 31, they must negotiate new agreements with the EC Commission. The EC has no significant reciprocal fishing interests with these countries, and it is expected to grant very limited access, requiring in some cases that all fishing be



phased out.

The Soviets and the East Europeans will be most seriously affected. The USSR now takes around 600,000 tons of fish a year from Community waters, and its catch there will be reduced by almost 60 percent through March 31.

The EC is prepared to negotiate an agreement with the Soviets effective from that date allowing an annual catch in each other's waters of about 60,000 tons—the amount Community trawlers now take in the Barents Sea. The Soviets and the East Europeans, however, refuse to recognize the EC's authority to negotiate for the Nine. They would prefer to deal with the EC members individually, but the Nine have so far rejected their bilateral approaches.

The foreign ministers also reviewed Commission efforts to negotiate access

for EC fishermen to other countries' 200-nautical-mile fishing zones. Substantial progress has been made in talks with the US and Norway, although several problems remain. Despite some delays, no major problems are anticipated with Canada. Negotiations are not progressing as smoothly with Iceland, which has become increasingly reluctant to offer the EC any meaningful concessions.

The Nine remain stalemated on the question of an internal Community fishery policy. Despite strong opposition from other member states, the UK and Ireland maintained their demands for an exclusive coastal fishing zone of up to 50 nautical miles. The foreign ministers hope interim internal arrangements can be worked out when they meet in special session next week.

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Middle East- Africa

LEBANON

19-21

President Sarkis appointed a cabinet of nonpolitical technocrats late last week in an effort to begin a reconstruction program that Sarkis hopes will lay the groundwork for the much more difficult process of political reconciliation.

Some Lebanese politicians—especially Christian conservative Camille Shamun—had been pressing for a cabinet containing representatives of the major political factions. Shamun was particularly unhappy with the new cabinet because the men chosen for prime minister and foreign minister had been associated with the late president Shihab, who was a major rival of Shamun.

The newly named ministers turned immediately to preparing a policy statement that will be presented to parliament for a vote of confidence; the statement is expected to set forth a broad timetable for

reconstruction activities. Sarkis hopes to get his rebuilding program under way before tackling the question of political reform, in order to keep reconstruction priorities from becoming a bone of sectarian contention and to generate an atmosphere of momentum that might facilitate reconciliation.

Little progress has been made in collecting heavy weapons from the various Palestinian and Lebanese militias. Sarkis presented a plan on this question to the quadripartite committee—composed of Saudi, Kuwaiti, Egyptian, and Syrian representatives—charged with implementing the Riyadh agreement that ended the fighting in Lebanon, but the committee has not yet acted on the plan. Christian objections to some compromise provisions in the plan appear to be a main cause of the delay.

The 42-man central committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization met in Damascus from December 12 to 14 and adopted a communique that emphasized the healing of the breach between the PLO and Syria. The communique did not repeat the Palestinian demand for the establishment of a secular Palestinian state

that would include what is now Israel. Although this is not the first time Palestinian bodies have omitted that demand, it in fact now seems to have been tacitly abandoned by the moderate majority of the Palestinian leadership.

On the other hand, the committee did not publicly commit itself to the acceptance of a Palestinian state composed of only the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—a position that many Palestinian leaders are willing to accept, but most refuse to adopt formally at this point. Instead, the communique spoke ambiguously of the Palestinians' "right to return" and establish "an independent state on their national soil"—a formulation that does not close off any options for PLO leader Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian leadership.

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BOTSWANA

67-68

Botswana is encountering growing problems in absorbing refugees who are arriving in increasing numbers from neighboring countries, especially South Africa and Rhodesia.

President Khama's government has long adhered to an open-door policy for refugees to help ensure Botswana's acceptance as a "front-line" state in the struggle to gain black majority rule in southern Africa. The Botswanans have consistently refused to support active black dissident groups because of Botswana's economic dependence on the two white-ruled countries.

This week, Botswana's acting foreign minister told the US ambassador that the refugee situation has become "critical" for his country. The number of refugees has increased considerably since the guerrilla war in Rhodesia picked up early this year and rioting began in black townships in South Africa last summer.

Nearly half of the 1,100 to 1,200 refugees currently in Botswana come from Soweto, the black township near Johannesburg that has been the scene of the most serious disturbances. Some 350

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President Sarkis



Rightist politician Camille Shamun

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are from Rhodesia, and about 100 each have come from Angola and Namibia. Many refugees are students who try to matriculate at schools in other countries, such as Tanzania, the UK, and the USSR.

While they are in Botswana—and some have been there for years—the refugees live in poor, crowded housing and constitute a serious social problem for the Botswanan government, which lacks resources to provide even elementary services. The government broadcast an appeal last month for international assistance.

dismissed last August. Both apparently resented being used as puppets by Siad. The Front is directed by a senior Somali military officer who is a cabinet minister and a member of the central committee of Somalia's ruling political party.



CHINA

48-50

A major national conference on agriculture is now in session in Peking. It is the latest in a series of economic conferences held in the last two months that seem intended to reassert leadership over key sectors of the economy with which leftists had interfered during the past year.

The meeting, the Second National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture, convened on December 10 with over 5,000 delegates. Tachai is the pace-setting Chinese model agricultural commune.

This conference, like the others in the

current series, will reaffirm general economic goals announced early in 1975 at the Fourth National People's Congress and at the First Tachai Conference in October 1975. An ambitious plan to expand the number of agricultural counties modeled after Tachai and to mechanize agricultural production by 1980 was set forth at those meetings.

Leftist critics blocked implementation of the program in many provinces. In particular, they resisted efforts to make changes in local leadership groups that were to precede other aspects of the program. In addition to assessing the extent to which this interference set back implementation of the goals announced in 1975, the current conference is likely to offer clear and authoritative guidance to local leaders on how to deal with supporters of the four leftist Politburo members purged in October.

Specific economic targets in agriculture and the other sectors of China's economy remain to be established. Production quotas, the place of material incentives, and the levels of imports and exports still seem to be under discussion while planners rewrite the Fifth Five Year Plan. They are not likely to finish before the middle of 1977.




Hua Kuo-feng delivering summary report at the First Tachai Conference in 1975

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Prime Minister Manley



Opposition leader Edward Seaga; beaten badly at the polls

Western Hemisphere

JAMAICA 53-60

Prime Minister Manley won a landslide victory December 15 in Jamaica's general election. His party will control at least 42 of the 60 parliamentary seats.

Manley's showing may encourage him to accelerate his efforts to create a one-party state. To accomplish this, he will have to increase his control of the security forces and weaken or take control of the media. Manley tried to force the press to submit to partial censorship during the election campaign.

Manley will continue to pursue close ties with Cuba; as in the past, this will reinforce his leftward bent at home. The Cuba-Jamaica technical commission will meet for the second time early next year, and the Jamaicans have already asked the Cubans to build a second school in the countryside to match one just completed near Kingston.

Relations with Cuba could be

strengthened even further if a visit Fidel Castro had been scheduled to make last May is reinstated. The visit may well take place sometime in the first half of 1977.

Manley also has indicated a willingness to take a fresh look at relations with the US. Any sustained improvement in relations, however, is likely to depend on US willingness to provide substantial assistance to help meet what the governor of the Bank of Jamaica estimates to be a pressing need for as much as \$200 million in budget and balance-of-payments support, presumably over the next year or so. Increasing private capital flight and the government's difficulty in garnering large new funds point to a payments gap in 1977 that dwindling reserves would be unable to cover.

There is little likelihood that Manley will alter the relatively prudent stance he has adopted, particularly during the last two years, in dealing with major US aluminum companies that operate in Jamaica. Agreements with Reynolds and Kaiser are likely in the next few months, and these probably will follow the general outlines of a settlement reached in October with Alcoa that seemed satisfactory to both sides.

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MEXICO

61-62

A Mexican federal court's annulment late last week of former president Echeverria's expropriation of 100,000



hectares of farmland in the northwest state of Sonora sets the stage for what will probably be a long and complex legal battle over claims on the land.

Although the head of a leftist peasant union warned that violence could result if the government attempts to carry out the court order and oust peasants from the land, indications are that both the government and the landowners will seek to negotiate a settlement. By midweek some peasants were peacefully vacating land they had occupied, but others stood firm.

President Lopez Portillo will probably try to persuade the landowners to donate some of the disputed land to peasants who refuse to budge. Both sides contend they are within the law. Peasant leaders assert that landowners are in violation of a law that limits them to ownership of 100 hectares of irrigated land.

The annulment reflects the more conservative policy on land reform of the Lopez Portillo administration. The new President will reportedly soon replace the leader of the government-run peasants confederation, who has been one of the leading proponents of land redistribution, with someone more attuned to his views. Lopez Portillo also has said he will create new judicial bodies outside the heavily

politicized Secretariat of Agrarian Reform to interpret land reform law.

Lopez Portillo also is taking a tougher line on peasant demands elsewhere. Last week, police ousted peasants who had taken over land in the state of Durango, and a show of force by army and police caused peasants to vacate land they had occupied in Sinaloa State. Peasant groups demonstrating in Mexico City for more expropriations in the southern part of the country have been getting an unsympathetic reaction from the new government.

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ARGENTINA

63-66

The navy and air force members of Argentina's three-man military junta are expressing increased dissatisfaction with what they view as inordinate army influence in the regime. Admiral Massera in particular is indulging even more than usual his penchant for sniping at President Videla, commander in chief of the army.


Massera and his air force counterpart,

General Agosti, are generally identified with the so-called hard-line current of opinion, which favors harsh national security measures and opposes early conciliatory gestures toward civilian groups.

In the past week or so, Massera has directed thinly veiled public criticism at the President and his chief ally, army chief of staff General Viola.

Chances are slim that Massera can, in the near future, engineer Videla's departure; it is even less likely that he could become president himself. The army is well established as the predominant service, and there is little evidence of active plotting within the army against the President.

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Members of the junta (l to r) Admiral Massera, President Videla, General Agosti

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The Fourth National Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party is under way. Hanoi has billed it as an opportunity to set guidelines for the "new stage" that now follows victory in the South and reunification.

91-92

Vietnam: Communist National Congress

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The Fourth National Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party, which began this week, is the first such meeting in 16 years. Earlier congresses have been benchmarks, laying out general guidelines for new directions in party policy.

The First Party Congress, held in 1935, developed plans for rebuilding the party after its near annihilation by the French in the early 1930s. The Second Party Congress in 1951 marked the escalation to all-out war against French colonial rule, and the Third Congress in 1960 made the

historic decision to renew the drive for control of the South. None of these decisions was made public at the time, but this year the party leadership is probably ready to shed some of its secretiveness.

The Fourth Congress has been advertised by Hanoi as an opportunity to issue guidelines for the "new stage" that now follows victory in the South and reunification. The congress has narrowed its goals to a "single strategic task—socialist revolution and construction," and is likely to focus specifically on the five-year plan

(1976-1980) and the election of a new Central Committee.

The resolutions coming out of this congress will be broad and over-optimistic but are likely to shed some light on where Vietnam is heading in the next few years.

A draft political report, which presumably is the principal document under discussion at the congress, has been issued and approved by the Central Committee. It concentrates primarily on economic development, a priority earlier established in Party First Secretary Le

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Duan's address last summer to the first meeting of the new National Assembly. Vietnam faces enormous problems in developing its economy and in integrating two vastly different economies into one socialist state.

Main Themes

The draft report acknowledges some of the country's most pressing problems—a food deficit, a shortage of capital, shortages of raw materials and fuel, and inept management and planning. Two themes emerge from the report and other recent policy statements: agriculture will take precedence over heavy industrial development, and the regime will take a cautious approach to the integration of the two economies. Over the past year, there have been signs of disagreement within the leadership over how fast and how forcefully to implement socialism in the South, but it now appears that caution has won out.

Qualified administrative personnel are in short supply, and forced collectivization runs a high risk of economic and political disruption. Although rice production has dropped in the South since the communist takeover, the South has a potential to produce sufficient rice to make up deficiencies in the North with a surplus for export. The former Saigon government's land reform program gave almost every rice farmer his own private plot; these farmers doubtless would stubbornly resist any government effort to take their land away, further lowering production and jeopardizing food supplies.

Some private ownership and management of industrial and commercial enterprises in the South also will be permitted to continue. This decision—expressed in the draft political report and in a recent official statement of guidelines on the issue—seems to have resulted from a drastic shortage of bureaucratic and technical expertise.

Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is given short shrift in the political report, which largely reiterates standard formulations of socialist solidarity, special relations with

Laos and Cambodia, and normal relations with all countries. Support is promised for the “just cause of the peoples of Southeast Asia for independence, democracy, peace, and genuine neutrality without foreign military bases and troops on their land.” This is an obvious signal to the new Thai government not to renew military ties with the US. The report also offers to develop



Le Duan

“relations of friendship and cooperation with Thailand.”

Vietnam has pursued a fairly active foreign policy since reunification, but the preoccupation with economic development is influencing its goals and methods. The food deficit and the country's dependence on imports for all petroleum and chemical fertilizer and for most industrial goods demand continuing commodity assistance.

Vietnam is anxious to reduce its dependence on the USSR by expanding economic contacts beyond the communist world and has been fairly successful in lin-

ing up aid and investment from noncommunist countries. Still, the USSR and—to a lesser degree—China and Eastern Europe continue to be Vietnam's principal suppliers of capital investment. A belligerent foreign policy would endanger Vietnam's prospects for Western money and technology.

Vietnam's military stands at wartime strength—which has been noted by nervous Southeast Asian neighbors—but it is primarily engaged in economic tasks. Although the political report virtually ignores the military's role in the “new stage,” several recent articles have emphasized the army's role in capital construction. Severe unemployment and the obvious advantages of a well-organized work force argue against any early demobilization and should explain the recent reactivation of the draft.

Stable Leadership

The selection of a new Central Committee will not affect the essential leadership of the party. Vietnam has had a remarkably stable leadership; its internal differences have been resolved or at least submerged in a collegial common front. Party notable Truong Chinh, whose policy of forced collectivization in the mid-1950s proved disastrous, lost some standing in the party but was not dramatically purged.

A few new faces will probably be added to inject new blood at the top. New full members or alternate members may also be added to the Politburo. Le Duan enjoys primacy in the party hierarchy and is the most likely candidate to be elected party chairman, a post that has been vacant since the death of Ho Chi Minh.

The Vietnamese leadership seems to fear that party members have grown lax and undisciplined and apparently hopes they will be reinvigorated by stock-taking at the party congress, although such lecturing has had little impact in the past.

The overwhelming emphasis on building the economy and strengthening the party reinforces the impression that most of Vietnam's energy and resources for the next few years will be absorbed by domestic tasks.

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